This overview of 'methodology problems' in international economic law (IEL) and adjudication defines 'legal methodology' as the 'best way' for identifying the 'sources' of law, legitimate authority, the methods of legal interpretation, law-making and adjudication, the 'primary rules of conduct' and 'secondary rules of recognition, change and adjudication', the relationships between 'legal positivism', 'natural law' and 'social theories of law', and the 'dual nature' of modern legal systems. It discusses the methodological challenges resulting from the often incomplete, fragmented and under-theorized nature of multilevel, public and private regulation of transnational movements of goods, services, persons, capital and related payments. Governments and lawyers disagree on how to define the legitimate functions of IEL as an instrument of social change, the 'legal system' of IEL, and how to transform the 'law in the books' into socially effective 'law in action' so as to protect the rights and welfare of citizens more effectively. Democratic, republican and cosmopolitan constitutionalism suggest that the five competing conceptions of IEL as (1) international law among states, (2) private international law (e.g. commercial, investment and 'conflicts law'), (3) multilevel economic regulation (e.g. based on 'law and economics'), (4) global administrative law and (5) multilevel constitutional law (e.g. in European common market and monetary regulation) need to be integrated; they must protect democratic, republican and cosmopolitan rights of citizens who -as 'constituent powers', 'democratic principals' and main economic actors -must hold multilevel governance institutions and their limited, delegated powers legally, democratically and judicially more accountable so as to limit 'market failures' as well as 'governance failures' more effectively. Arguably, the universal recognition of human and constitutional rights of citizens requires cosmopolitan reforms of IEL and stronger judicial remedies for protection of transnational rule of law.
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Western democratic constitutionalism proceeds from the insight that -both in national constitutional democracies and also in supranational regional communities like the European Union (EU) -the constitutionally agreed 'principles of justice' (e.g. the human rights proclaimed in the US Declaration of Independence of 1776) must be transformed into constitutional and democratic legislation, administration, adjudication and international agreements in order to 'constitutionalize' legal systems and institutionalize 'public reason' for the benefit of citizens, thereby enhancing the democratic capabilities and 'republican virtues' necessary for protecting PGs. Since Plato's book on The Republic 1 See, e.g., J.Rawls, The Law of Peoples, Harvard UP 1999, at 79 ff, who emphasizes the limited political functions of UN HRL
(1) to justify the legitimacy of states, (2) interventions in international relations, and (3) to legally limit pluralism among peoples. By contrast, the 2009 Lisbon Treaty on European Union (e.g. Articles 2, 3, 21 TEU) and its EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) recognize civil, political, economic and social human rights as integral parts of European law deriving from respect for human dignity. Even if recognition of UN and regional HRL and its derivation from respect for human dignity does not entail that all moral human rights are part of UN or European HRL, the moral and legal justification by human dignity and basic human needs (including institutionalization of 'public reason' as a precondition for democratic capabilities) recognizes much broader 'political functions' of HRL (e.g. in the context of international health law, copyright law, humanitarian and criminal law) than the narrow conceptions advocated by J.Rawls and by advocates of power-oriented, 'realist conceptions' of 'international law among sovereign states'.
(ca 375 BC), the metaphor of the 'state ship' is used in Western republicanism for describing the legal structure that protects society from the dangerous waters surrounding it. The Chinese proverb attributed to the Confucian philosopher Xunzi (298-220 BC) uses the metaphor of the 'state ship' in a significantly different way: 'The heavens create the people and appoint the ruler. The ruler is like a boat, the people are like the water. The water may support the boat, and it may also capsize it.' In the Western metaphor, society and its rulers are on the boat together, and the captain acts as an agent of the people who are the democratic principal and 'constituent power'. The Chinese metaphor describes the people as keeping the state afloat without being on board the ship and without being capable of reforming or steering it. Such different 'pre-conceptions' of law and the state are likely to influence legal interpretations.
For instance, the 1982 Constitution of the People's Republic of China is based on the democratic principle that 'all power belongs to the people' (Article 2). Democratic constitutions derive from this principle the need for protecting human rights and delegation of limited powers to democratically elected legislative, executive and judicial government branches so as to protect constitutional, participatory, representative and deliberative self-government by citizens and peoples. China's Constitution, however, emphasizes the need for 'dictatorship by the proletariat' (Preamble) and the 'people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class' (Article 1), as postulated by Karl Marx based on his claims to know 'historic truth' about the domination of the human condition by materialism. Human rights and democratic constitutionalism, by contrast, proceed from the 'Kantian premise' that -because the limits of cognitive human reason (e.g. in terms of time, space, causality, subjective human senses) exclude knowledge of 'absolute truth' -democratic constitutions must prioritize protection of individual human dignity (e.g. in terms of equal autonomy rights to choose one's own conceptions of a 'good life' and 'social justice', freedom to 'falsify' claims of truth). Also 'republican constitutionalism' focuses on participatory rights and republican virtues of citizens who must assume responsibility for protecting collective supply of (inter)national 'public goods' (res publica). Hence, should a 'court of justice' in a constitutional democracy (like India) with a Constitution committed to protection of fundamental rights and democratic constitutionalism interpret international treaty obligations (e.g. under UN HRL) in conformity with the constitutional rights of domestic citizens (e.g. the freedom of occupation, trade or business as protected in Article 19 of the 1949 Constitution of India) without regard to legal claims in other countries that support unlimited powers of governments (e.g. as claimed by communist rulers) and divergent treaty interpretations entailing 'lack of reciprocity' in international relations among treaty partners?
Legal methodology for the world trading system: A multilevel 'republic of peoples and citizens'?
The term 'legal methodology' is used here as the 'best way' for identifying the 'sources' of law, legitimate authority, the methods of legal interpretation, the 'primary rules of conduct' and 'secondary rules of recognition, change and adjudication', the relationship between 'legal positivism', 'natural law', and 'social theories of law', and the 'dual nature' of modern legal systems. The etymological origins of the word methodology -i.e. the Greek word 'meta-hodos', referring to 'following the road' -suggest that globalization and its transformation of most national PGs 2 into transnational 'aggregate PGs' -like human rights, rule of law, democratic peace and mutually beneficial, international monetary, trading, development, environmental, communication and legal systems promoting 'sustainable development' -require new legal methodologies in order to enable citizens and peoples to increase their social welfare through global cooperation. For instance, when communist China decided in 1978 to liberalize and regulate its national trade barriers on the basis of GATT rules and succeeded in lifting hundreds of millions of poor people out of poverty through restructuring China's economy in conformity with GATT/WTO law, China's legal methodology of regulating trade and domestic economic welfare fundamentally changed. Even though China prioritized 'four modernizations' (of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense), such changes of economic law and legal methodology tend to have systemic repercussions on legal systems beyond the economy. For instance, the autonomous WTO memberships of the four customs territories of China, Macau, Hong Kong and Taiwan set incentives for peaceful reduction of the economic and legal divisions of China as a single sovereign country, e.g. due to rules-based free trade agreements progressively recreating a common market. 3 As GATT/WTO law continues to be deliberately kept outside the UN legal system: Which of the competing foreign policy paradigms -like nationalist and 'realist' foreign policies for an international 'society of states', an 'international law of peoples', a cosmopolitan international law of citizens, or republican conceptions of 'international law for common PGs' -fits best into the system of 'international economic law' (IEL)?
From jurisprudence to legal philosophy
Law can be defined (e.g. also in China) as authoritatively issued rules and related principles of social regulation that are enforced in order to serve social needs and values, as they are defined at particular times in particular places. Jurisprudence in the sense of practical knowledge related to law is much older than legal philosophy about the morality and ultimate values of law. According to the German philosopher I.Kant (1724-1804), philosophy is essentially about three questions: (1) What can we know (e.g. in social and natural sciences)? (2) What shall we do (e.g. in morality and politics)? (3) What can we hope for beyond our limited knowledge (e.g. regarding questions of meta-physics and religion)? According to Kant, human answers to these questions inevitably depend on our conceptions of human beings. This is true also for legal philosophy as part of the social sciences, which is concerned with the two questions of (1) what can we know about law; and (2) what should we do in law and politics as private individuals, citizens, government officials, judges or members of parliaments? Constitutional democracies recognize citizens and peoples as 'constituent powers' that must hold all 'constituted', limited governance powers legally, democratically and judicially accountable so as to limit abuses of public and private powers in the collective supply of PGs demanded by citizens.
The ancient Greek philosopher Plato compared the 'human condition' to prisoners in a cave, who observe shades on the wall without being capable of leaving the cave and regarding the true objects outside the cave in the sunlight that projects the shades into the cave. According to Plato, only philosophers might be capable of leaving the cave and discovering objective truths; hence, citizens should be governed by 'philosopher kings' who can discern objective truth. Kant (1724-1804), by contrast, refuted the human capacity to discover objective truth. According to Kant, all human knowledge is constructed by human perceptions and the limitations of autonomous thinking. Kant rejected authoritarian claims of political philosophers like T.Hobbes (1588-1679), according to whom citizens should delegate absolute powers to political rulers in order to enable benevolent rulers to terminate the social 'war of everybody against everybody else' driven by the rational egoism and animal instincts of human beings (homo homini lupus est). According to Kant, the 'democratic revolution' leading to the transformation of the American colonies into the USA demonstrated the human capacity to establish 'democratic self-government' and social peace based on rule of law -rather than 'rule of men' as postulated by Hobbes. In view of the diverse knowledge of citizens and their diverse democratic preferences, republican and liberal legal philosophies call for justification of law and governance through social contracts among citizens establishing limited governance powers that must remain constitutionally restrained by agreed 'principles of justice' based on respect for human dignity, equal constitutional rights, institutional 'checks and balances' and 'republican virtues' of citizens (like Kant's 'moral imperative' of respecting maximum equal liberties subject to rule of law). 4 Such 'deontological' justifications of law and democratic governance (e.g. in terms of equal rights of all citizens as 'democratic principals' of governance agents) are historically more recent than 'consequentialist' justifications (e.g. of 'states' and international law in terms of government control over a population in a limited territory). 'Republican constitutionalism' (e.g. since the ancient Athenian and Roman city constitutions some 2500 years ago) was justified on grounds of both rights of citizens (e.g. the property rights of male adults), collective supply of PGs demanded by citizens, and republican 'virtue politics' (Aristotle). Democratic, republican and cosmopolitan constitutionalism emphasizes the importance of constitutional rights of citizens for holding all governance agents accountable and for institutionalizing 'public reason' guiding the dynamic evolution of legal systems.
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The 'human condition' and the 'dual nature' of modern legal systems
The Kantian conception of human reasonableness underlies also modern HRL based on the today universal 'recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family (as) the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world' (Preamble of the UDHR). 'All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood' (Article 1 UDHR). Yet, such legal assumptions of human reasonableness may conflict with economic models of a selfish homo economicus maximizing individual preferences through cost-benefit calculations. Also 'public choice analyses' of rational behavior in 'political markets' acknowledge the psychological, social and cultural influences on decision-making and human behavior, such as the 'three principles' of  'thinking automatically' (e.g. 'fast' and 'spontaneous' rather than 'deliberative' and 'reasonable slow thinking');
 'thinking socially' (e.g. adjusting to social contexts of corruption); and  'thinking with mental models' that depend on the situation and the culture (e.g. in under-regulated financial industries profiting from tax-avoidance and circumvention of the law).
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The search for the 'sources' of IEL, the best methods of legal interpretation, the 'primary rules of conduct' and 'secondary rules of recognition, change and adjudication' of IEL is usually approached from the point of view of legal positivism as a discovery of legal facts in the sense of authoritative lawmaking and effective law-enforcement. For example, Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) codifies the sources of international law in terms of 'international conventions', 'international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law', and 'general principles of law recognized by civilized nations'. The same article defines the 'rules of recognition' not only in terms of recognition by states; the references to 'civilized nations' and to 'judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists … as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law' qualify state consent in conformity with the customary rules of treaty interpretation as codified in the VCLT. For example, the Preamble and Articles 31-33 VCLT require not only that 'a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose' (Article 31, para.1). Article 31:3,c also clarifies that '(t)here shall be taken into account, together with the context…. (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties'. As all UN member states have accepted human rights obligations as well as other 'principles of justice' under the UN Charter and under additional UN conventions, the Preamble of the VCLT emphasizes  'that disputes concerning treaties, like other international disputes, should be settled by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law'…,  'Recalling the determination of the peoples of the United Nations to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties can be maintained',  'Having in mind the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations such as the principles of the equal rights and self-determination of peoples, of the sovereign equality and independence of all States, of non-interference in the domestic affairs of States, of the prohibition of the threat of use of force and of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all'.
The more 'principles of justice' and 'inalienable human rights' are recognized as integral parts of national and international legal systems, the more does this 'dual nature' of modern legal systems -e.g. as legal facts and normative objectives that are inadequately realized in the non-ideal reality of national and international legal systems -challenge traditional distinctions between legal positivism, natural law theories and sociological conceptions of law focusing on the 'law in action' as a 'reality check' for the 'law in the books'. The universal recognition of the 'inalienable' and 'indivisible nature' of civil, political, economic, social and cultural human rights deriving from respect for the human dignity and reasonableness of human beings has incorporated natural law theory into positive national and international legal systems. The 'inalienable core' of human rights and democratic self-governance limits power-oriented conceptions of 'rule by law'. The universal recognition by all UN member states of a human right to democratic self-governance reflects the concern of social theories of law that mere authoritative issuance of legal rules may not create 'positive law' unless the rules and governmental authority are also legitimized by democratic consent and voluntary rule-compliance by free and equal citizens. As long as UN and WTO law and practices are dominated by governments that prioritize their own rights over those of citizens, civil societies are rightly challenging state-centered interpretations of IEL excluding democratic rights of citizens to invoke international 'PGs treaties' in domestic courts of justice, as illustrated by the criticism from European citizens and parliaments of the exclusion of rights and remedies of citizens in the transatlantic free trade agreements of the EU with Canada (e.g. Article 14.16 CETA draft text of 2014).
Constitutional and republican conceptions of law as struggles for justice: The PG of an open trading system as a 'republic of citizens'?
Legal positivism tends to define national and international law by the authoritative issuance and social effectiveness of legal rules and principles of law. Legal systems are construed as a union of 'primary rules of conduct' and 'secondary rules' of recognition, change and adjudication 7 that dynamically interact with general principles of law and with legal practices; the interactions of indeterminate 'principles of law' with specific rules may justify diverse legal interpretations, just as changing legal practices by private and public legal actors may justify conflicting legal claims for 'new interpretations' of rules so as to make them more consistent with 'principles of justice' and 'duties to protect PGs', thereby challenging traditional distinctions between legal positivism, natural law theories and social conceptions of law. 8 The litigation by tobacco producers challenging health regulations restricting supply and consumption of tobacco illustrate how national, regional, WTO and investment tribunals increasingly interpret economic rights in conformity with health rights and corresponding governmental duties to protect public health as a PG, as discussed below (section VI). Regardless of whether the need for legally and judicially reconciling private and public interests focuses on private rights (e.g. in human rights courts) or on public interests (e.g. in international courts like the ICJ and the WTO Appellate Body), the legislative, administrative or judicial 'balancing procedures' must aim at limiting unjustified divergences resulting from legal 'fragmentation' or from competing, specialized 'jurisdictions'. Similar to past struggles for decolonization, the unnecessary poverty and disregard for human rights inside many UN member states trigger and justify antagonistic 'struggles for justice' (e.g. in the successive 'Arab springs') by citizens -as democratic holders of 'constituent powers' -aimed at legally limiting abuses of public and private 'constituted, limited powers'. All national and international legal systems are based on 'incomplete agreements' that require constant clarifications of indeterminate legal principles and adaptations of incomplete rules to changing circumstances. For example, the recognition by all UN member states of 'inalienable' civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of citizens remains subject to 'limitation clauses' in national constitutions, legislation and international agreements that must be applied and clarified through constitutional, legislative, administrative, judicial and international legal processes in response to the often diverse democratic preferences of peoples, the constitutional rights of citizens, their limited resources and the changing international challenges (like climate change and current migration and displacement of 60 million peoples). The American philosopher J.Rawls suggests to understand legal systems as social and political processes aimed at institutionalizing 'public reason' through constitutional, legislative, executive, judicial and international rule-making. From such a dynamic 'constitutional perspective', many areas of IEL suffer from noninclusive rule-making and 'limited public reason', for instance due to the 'executive dominance' and intergovernmental law-making in most international organizations treating citizens as mere objects rather than as 'democratic principals' of all governance institutions.
9 Such 'incomplete rules' (e.g. in GATT Article XXIII:1 on 'violation complaints', 'non-violation complaints' and 'situation complaints') may be 'efficient' if governments cannot agree on precise definitions of the rules and delegate their progressive clarification to future dispute settlement processes. Similarly, the fragmented international agreements on collective supply of international PGs -like international monetary, trade, investment, environmental, development, human rights and international criminal law agreements -remain subject to 'public interest clauses' reserving sovereign rights to limit and reconcile 'overlapping treaty obligations' for 'interdependent PGs'. For example, the 1994 Agreement establishing the WTO recognizes sovereign rights to restrict international trade in order to protect public health. Yet, these rights are acknowledged and regulated in diverse ways, for instance in treaty preambles (e.g. the Preamble of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade = TBT), in treaty provisions on 'objectives' and 'principles' (e.g. Articles 7 and 8 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights = TRIPS), or in exception clauses (like GATT Article XX). WTO dispute settlement bodies had to clarify whether theses different legal drafting and regulatory methodologies 8 As modern positive legal systems include 'inalienable' human rights and other constitutional 'principles of justice', modern legal positivists acknowledge that moral-based legal arguments may be relevant also for examining the validity of legal rules (cf. R.Alexy, The Argument from Injustice, OUP 2010). The constant interaction between 'law as a legal order' and 'law as legal practices' is emphasized by 'critical legal positivism', according to which law and its legal changes should be examined on (1) the surface level of positive law, (2) the legal culture, and (3) the deep structures of law; cf. K. How to justify and design IEL for a multilevel 'Republic of Peoples'?
European and Asian philosophical thinking and their impact on economic regulation evolved in fundamentally different ways, for instance in view of the fact that the 2500 years of European deliberations on democratic and republican governance of PGs (res publica) and many of the western philosophical categories (like metaphysics, epistemology, psychology, logic) have no equivalents in Indian or Chinese philosophy. 11 The economy of British India under colonial rule was remarkably stagnant and characterized by social oppression (e.g. caste systems), famines and low life expectancy (e.g. 27 years in 1931). India's post-independence achievements in pioneering democratic governance, maintaining a secular state and achieving rapid economic growth since the 1980s (i.e. after previous experimentation with Gandhi's promotion of a 'return to the spinning wheel in the village' and Nehru's socialist economic policies) remain qualified by unnecessary poverty, environmental problems and social discrimination (e.g. of the Dalit caste, women), inadequate infrastructures and social services (from schooling and health care to provision of food security, safe water and drainage), unequal income 10 See the more than hundred case-examples in Petersmann (note 4), chapter VIII. 11 Cf. R.P.Chakravarthi, Eastern Philosophy, London: Weidenfeld 2005. The book also emphasizes the different focus in Indian philosophy (e.g. its metaphysical focus on exploring one's true self) and Chinese philosophy (e.g. its greater focus on inner and social harmony, wise governments and responsible citizens).
distribution and corruption. 12 The universal commitment (e.g. in UN HRL) to respect for the value premises of 'normative individualism' and 'human dignity' (e.g. in terms of equal autonomy rights) entails that state-centered 'Westphalian conceptions' of IEL must remain embedded into citizenoriented, constitutional rules for constituting, limiting, regulating and justifying multilevel governance of global PGs like the world trading system. As illustrated also by the UN Guiding Principles for business and human rights and their incorporation into the legal practices of thousands of transnational business corporations and other non-governmental organizations (like the International Federation of Football Associations) in the context of the 'UN Global Compact' 13 , the mutually beneficial cooperation among private producers, investors, traders and consumers -and the limited delegation of regulatory powers to multilevel governance institutions -remain constitutionally limited by equal human, constitutional and cosmopolitan rights (like freedom of commercial contracts, transfer of property rights, mutually agreed arbitration) limiting abuses of power in all human transactions in national, transnational and international interactions. As centralized, worldwide governance systems tend to be neither politically feasible nor legally and economically desirable (e.g. in view of their inadequate information and coordination mechanisms and potential abuses of power), respect for the constitutional rights of citizens requires decentralized 'bottom-up governance' based on multilevel constitutional and republican rights, obligations and decentralized coordination mechanisms (like market competition).
Republican theories of 'aggregate PGs' and 'collective action problems'
In contrast to private goods that are produced spontaneously in private markets in response to effective demand by consumers, PGs (like human rights, rule of law) depend on collective supply by governments due to inadequate incentives or means for their private protection. Depending on their respective 'provision paths', some PGs can be supplied unilaterally by 'single best efforts' (e.g. an invention). The supply of some other PGs depends on the 'weakest links' (e.g. dyke-building, global polio eradication, nuclear non-proliferation). 'Aggregate global PGs' -like a mutually beneficial world trading systemtend to be supplied through a 'summation process' of local, national and regional PGs. They are confronted with numerous 'collective action problems' such as:
 'prisoner dilemmas' and 'free-riding' due to attempts at avoiding the costs of producing PGs (like protection of world food security through FAO/WTO commitments, climate change prevention through carbon-dioxide limitations) that benefit also the 'free-riders' refusing to share the adjustment costs;
 'jurisdiction gaps' and 'governance gaps' due to power politics (e.g. veto-powers preventing consensus-based conclusion of the WTO Doha Round negotiations, non-ratification of the International Criminal Court jurisdiction by China, Russia and the USA, non-implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its circumvention by 'failed states' like North-Korea);
 lack of resources, inadequate protection of property rights and 'capture' of regulatory institutions (e.g. impeding protection of biodiversity and tropical forests in many less-developed countries);
 'constitutional gaps' and 'accountability gaps' (e.g. for protecting human rights and rule of law in UN governance) due to inadequate leadership for 'responsible sovereignty' and 'duties to protect internationally agreed common concerns'; or  'incentive gaps' and 'discourse failures' due to non-inclusive 'executive domination' of intergovernmental organizations treating citizens as mere objects rather than as 'democratic principals' of all governance institutions and 'agents of justice'.  -UN Specialized Agencies, the WTO and ever more regional economic organizations recognize that their primary and 'secondary' treaty law is increasingly limited by 'global administrative law' principles protecting transparency, legal accountability and rule of law in multilevel governance of international monetary stability, the world trading system, world food security, global health protection and other transnational PGs.
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In order to develop a coherent theory of IEL and clarify the legal interrelationships among different value premises, one can use the distinction by the American legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin of the following 'four stages of legal theory':
 at the semantic stage of law, many legal terms (like 'IEL', human rights, trade and investment law standards like non-discrimination and 'fair and equitable treatment') remain indeterminate 'interpretive concepts' that may be used by different actors with different meanings;
 at the jurisprudential stage, IEL requires justification in terms of 'principles of justice' (e.g. statecentered vs cosmopolitan, constitutional and global administrative law conceptions of IEL) and elaboration of a convincing theory of 'rule of law' that citizens can accept as legitimate;
 at the doctrinal stage, the 'truth conditions' have to be constructed of how particular fields of lawmaking and administration can best realize their values and justify their practices and ideals (e.g. insisting on competition, environmental and social law limiting 'market failures' as pre-condition of a well-functioning 'social market economy'); and  judicial administration of justice must apply, clarify and enforce the law in concrete disputes by independent and impartial rule-clarification that institutionalizes 'public reason' and protects equal rights and social peace.
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Since Aristotle, procedural, distributive, corrective, commutative justice and equity continue to be recognized as diverse 'spheres of justice' in the design and justification of dispute settlement systems (e.g., for 'violation complaints', 'non-violation complaints' and 'situation complaints' pursuant to GATT Article XXIII). Post-colonial IEL also includes 'principles of transitional justice' based on preferential treatment of less-developed countries (e.g., in Part IV of GATT and in the dispute settlement system of the WTO) as well as 'cosmopolitan principles of justice' based on the universal human rights obligations of all UN member states. In contrast to the 'freedoms of the ancient' (B.Constant) which protected only limited freedoms of a privileged class of male property owners (e.g. in the republican 15 For a discussion of these competing conceptions of IEL see Petersmann (note 4), chapter 1. 16 Cf. R.Dworkin, Justice in Robes, Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2006, at 9 ff.
constitutions of Athens and Rome 2500 years ago), modern constitutional democracies proceed from equal human rights and constitutional rights of citizens as preconditions for 'constitutional justice'.
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Does HRL require cosmopolitan conceptions of IEL?
The more civil, political, economic, social and cultural human rights protect corresponding private, political, economic, social and cultural freedoms that must be legally constituted, limited, regulated and justified through democratic legislation, administration, adjudication, international law and multilevel governance of transnational PGs, the more must multilevel economic regulation be interpreted and protected for the benefit of citizens as 'democratic principals' of governance agents with constitutionally limited, delegated powers. In regional customs union and free trade agreements (FTAs) among European countries, trade rules addressed to governments have been consistently interpreted and protected by national and European courts as protecting also equal freedoms and rights of citizens rather than only reciprocal rights of governments. As stated by the EU Court of Justice (CJEU), ' the fact that certain provisions of the Treaty are formally addressed to the Member States does not prevent rights from being conferred at the same time on any individual who has an interest in compliance with the obligations thus laid down'.
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Such interpretation of liberal trade rules recognizing private economic actors and citizens as legal subjects of IEL is in conformity with the citizen-oriented, rights-based nature of international commercial law (e.g. based on private contract law, property rights and autonomously agreed arbitration), international investment law (e.g. protecting investor rights and remedies though investment treaties), HRL and constitutional law (e.g. protecting basic rights of citizens as 'constituent powers' and 'democratic principals' vis-à-vis government agents with limited, delegated powers). 
'Constitutional justice' and different 'contexts of justice'
Theories of justice emphasize the need for 'constitutional justice' protecting the impartiality and independence of 'courts of justice' (as exemplars of public reason) and of constitutional assemblies elaborating 'constitutions' constituting a social order and its basic long-term rules, institutions and principles asserting a higher legal rank. Such 'principles of justice' are not about absolute truths, but about protecting individual and democratic diversity and legal equality in 'different contexts' of procedural, distributive, corrective, commutative justice and equity in all human interactions in national, transnational and international relations by distinguishing, respecting and 'balancing' private and public 17 Cf. E.U. autonomy rights and corresponding duties. 20 The customary law requirement of settling disputes 'in conformity with human rights' and other 'principles of justice' requires 'balancing' all civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and the corresponding 'public interests' and governmental 'duties to protect'. Such 'balancing' and 'weighting' 21 may differ depending on the diverse 'contexts of justice':
 the different contexts of private moral and legal freedoms protect diverse ethical conceptions of a 'good life' through moral and legal rights and duties;
 the utilitarian principles underlying multilevel economic regulation -such as the legal ranking of trade policy instruments in GATT/WTO law according to their respective economic efficiency, or the commitment of EU law to a 'highly competitive social market economy' within 'an area of freedom, security and justice' (Article 3 TEU) among 28 EU member states -aim at protecting 'justice as economic efficiency' 22 , albeit often in imperfect ways, as illustrated by the one-sidedly libertarian focus on economic liberties and property rights in international investment, commercial and intellectual property law and adjudication; 23  the legal prioritization e.g. in democratic constitutions and human rights instruments) of human and constitutional rights over utilitarian 'common goods' is justified by democratic 'discourse justifications' (e.g. recognizing social discourse as reasonable only to the extent that the discourse partners implicitly and autonomously recognize each other as free and equal participants in their discursive search for truth) 24 ; contrary to John Locke (who invoked god for justifying human rights), constitutional democracies, European and UN HRL derive 'inalienable human rights' from respect for such human reasonableness, including a right 'to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized' (Article 28 UDHR); 22 By treating citizens as mere objects of governmental 'utility maximization' and neglecting human rights, utilitarian focus on efficient production and distribution offers no guarantee for taking into account the non-economic dimensions of human welfare, for instance whenever restrictive business practices or emergency situations increase prices depriving poor people of effective access to water, essential food and medical services. The utilitarian assumption that morality consists in weighing and aggregating costs and benefits so as to 'maximize happiness' (e.g., by governmental redistribution of the 'gains from trade' at the whim of the rulers) risks being inconsistent with the moral principles underlying modern human rights (like respect for human dignity and 'inalienable' human rights). 23 On libertarian theories of 'justice in initial holdings' and 'justice in transfer' see: R.Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Oxford: Blackwell, 1974. In the 21st century, libertarian claims to unrestricted self-ownership (e.g., to sell one's body parts), freedom of voluntary exchange (e.g., for outsourcing pregnancy for pay) and compensation for 'regulatory takings' of foreign investor rights, like libertarian opposition to governmental taxation for financing the supply of PGs, risk being inconsistent with HRL and democratic legislation. 24 On discourse theory, and the implicit, moral respect of discourse partners as having reasonable autonomy and dignity, as . Similar to Kant's justification of his cosmopolitan 'right of hospitality' on moral grounds, the legal interpretation of EU 'market freedoms' as 'fundamental rights' can be justified on moral rather than only utilitarian grounds (e.g., as representing 'generalizable human interests' of all EU citizens). Also the derivation of individual investor rights and judicial remedies from international investment treaties, like the derivation of labor rights from ILO conventions, can be justified not only on utilitarian grounds, but also on human rights principles. 25 Kantian, Rawlsian and other modern theories of justice (e.g., by R.Dworkin and B.Ackerman) explain why moral respect for human autonomy and reasonableness requires the priority of equal liberty rights (as 'first principle of justice') over particular conceptions of the 'good life' and the 'common good'. According to both Kant and Rawls, a just society protects the equal freedoms of its citizens to pursue their own, often diverse conceptions for a good life -provided such conceptions  even though the universal recognition of human rights (e.g., in UN law) as constitutional foundation of all governance powers confirms the legal priority of equal human freedoms (as defined by human and constitutional rights) as integral part of positive, national and international legal systems in the 21st century, most human rights guarantees remain subject to communitarian regulation in order to protect PGs. Yet, in contrast to English conceptions of parliamentary sovereignty and American conceptions of civil and political human and constitutional rights as 'trumping' in case of conflicts with democratic majority legislation, European courts acknowledge that legislative and administrative restrictions on human rights require 'balancing' of competing civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights in order to establish whether governmental restrictions are suitable, necessary and proportionate means for reconciling competing rights through reasonable procedures.
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The inevitable controversies over principles of procedural justice, distributive justice, corrective and commutative justice and equity in IEL illustrate that -also in many areas of IEL -'justice', as a 'relational concept' that protects 'just relations among persons', continues to be procedurally and substantively under-defined. It requires multilevel legal clarification through discursive justification and legal and judicial clarification vis-à-vis individuals as 'agents of justice', who are entitled to public justification of governmental restrictions of their human, constitutional and other rights. 27 For instance, by clarifying indeterminate rules through legally binding interpretations and judicial 'gap-filling', investment arbitral awards and WTO dispute settlement findings -similar to other judicial jurisprudence -progressively develop the law and its underlying 'general principles' 28 , thereby justifying the systemic relationships between rules and institutions and often inducing legislative and administrative responses that can further clarify indeterminate rules.
Dialectic 'fragmentation' and 'integration' of legal systems through democratic, republican and cosmopolitan constitutionalism
In contrast to authoritarian 'top-down conceptions' of legal and social regulation (e.g. from Confucius and Plato up to Karl Marx), liberalism and democratic constitutionalism perceive legal, institutional and methodological 'fragmentation' -as well as progressive 're-integration' through diverse 'constitutional' and 'judicial methods' -as dialectic legal processes, as illustrated by the constitutional 'checks and balances' separating legislative, executive and judicial branches of government and the customary law requirement of interpreting treaties and settling related disputes 'in conformity with the principles of justice and international law' (Preamble and Article 31 VCLT). In view of the human rights obligations and corresponding constitutional limitations of all governance institutions, legal interpretations of IEL should embrace inclusive 'constitutional methodologies' that acknowledge  the reasonable, common interests of all human beings in protecting producers, investors, workers, traders and consumers cooperating in a mutually beneficial, global division of labor;
remain compatible with equal freedoms for all -without imposing any particular conception of a good life; cf. R.  the corresponding government duties to respect, protect and fulfill the human and constitutional rights of citizens in response to their democratic demands for more effective protection of international PGs; and  the democratic and republican need for justifying legitimate authority and for holding all government and 'governance' powers accountable vis-à-vis citizens as 'democratic principals' and 'republican owners' of the polity.
Cosmopolitan methodologies -by taking into account the embeddedness of modern legal systems in a 'global legal world', as well as the indispensable role of citizens, transnational rights and international law for protecting 'aggregate PGs' as defined, inter alia, by human and constitutional rights of citizens -can succeed only as multidisciplinary approaches to legal problems in their transnational political, economic, social and cultural contexts, with due respect for 'methodological pluralism'. 29 As politics will often continue to be controlled by local and national interests, the task of jurisprudential and doctrinal rethinking and reordering of incoherencies among local, national, transnational and international rules, principles and governance institutions falls also on civil society, scholars and courts of justice whenever they are confronted with injustices of UN and GATT/WTO rules and policies and inadequate responses by national governments and parliaments.
Need for comparative institutionalism
'Comparative institutionalism' empirically confirms that multilevel regulation of transnational PGs should rely on decentralized regulatory methods (like citizen-driven markets, democratic decisionmaking, contract law and litigation) -rather than only on centralized regulatory agencies and intergovernmental (e.g. UN/WTO) organizations -for limiting the ubiquity of 'market failures' and 'governance failures' in transnational economic relations. Also the 15 UN Specialized Agencies rely on often diverse treaty rules, institutions and decision-making processes for collective supply of functionally limited, yet interdependent global PGs. Some UN Specialized Agencies justify their law and governance on deontological grounds, such as labor rights justifying the law and governance of the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the 'enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health (as) one of the fundamental rights of every human being' justifying the law and governance of the World Health Organization (cf. the Preamble of the WHO). Other organizations refer to consequentialist and utilitarian justifications, such as 'ensuring humanity's freedom from hunger' as explicit objective of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, or 'raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand' (Preamble of GATT 1947). The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization recognizes the importance of promoting 'public reason' and 'republican virtues' through 'education of humanity for justice and liberty and peace' in view of the fact that 'since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed' (Preamble of the UNESCO Constitution). The jurisprudence of UN tribunals increasingly reflects the structural and transformational changes of international law, for instance  by increasing references in ICJ jurisprudence to other international, regional and also national courts of justice 'as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law' ( The reality of 'institutional pluralism' and 'constitutional pluralism' at worldwide, regional and national levels of governance confirms that different 'PGs regimes' pursuing different policy objectives and 'principles of justice' may also require different governance institutions depending on their specific 'collective action problems'. For instance, the tripartite structures of ILO institutions are justifiable by the competing rights and interests of labor representatives (e.g. interested in high wages), employer representatives (e.g. interested in low production costs) and governments (e.g. interested in 'social peace' and avoidance of costly strikes). The compulsory WTO dispute settlement system offers a mutually beneficial PG due to its reduction of transaction costs, promotion of legal security, and progressive clarification of indeterminate legal rules and principles through impartial and independent adjudication.
Multilevel governance problems of 'global PGs': from 'law and economics' towards the 'Geneva consensus'
A mutually beneficial trading system belongs to the most ancient economic PGs, for instance promoting trade in the Mediterranean and Europe based on Roman law, transnational commercial law (lex mercatoria) and international trade agreements among Greek and Italian city republics. The term 'Washington consensus' is used for describing the market-oriented economic policies underlying the 1944 Bretton Woods agreements and the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947) as applied by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in their lending and financial assistance policies. Their focus on macroeconomic disciplines (e.g. fiscal and budget disciplines, tax reform, liberalizing interest rates, competitive exchange rates), trade and investment liberalization, privatization, deregulation and protection of property rights has come under increasing criticism from the 'Geneva consensus' underlying the law of UN human rights bodies, the ILO and other UN institutions (like the WHO) at Geneva, which justify multilevel governance of international PGs in terms of civil, political, economic, social and cultural human rights (i.e. normative individualism) rather than only in terms of state sovereignty and economically 'optimal ranking' of policy instruments (e.g. marketbased tariffs and exchange rates rather than non-tariff trade barriers, separation and market-based  non-discriminatory taxes, product and production regulations, and competition rules are considered to be economically optimal and legally permitted (e.g. pursuant to GATT Article III) in view of their avoidance of discriminatory market distortions;
 discriminatory trade restrictions at national borders are permitted only as border taxes (notably tariffs) within the limits of reciprocally agreed tariff bindings (cf. Articles II, XVIII GATT) that do not interrupt the market mechanisms based on supply and demand;
 discriminatory non-tariff trade barriers are prohibited in view of their additional welfare costs and market-distorting effects (cf. Article XI GATT) subject to 'public policy exceptions' reserving sovereign rights to protect non-economic PGs (e.g. Article XIX-XXI GATT);
 discriminatory export subsidies and 'import-substitution subsidies' are prohibited according to the GATT/WTO subsidy rules in view of their trade-distorting effects; production subsidies are 'actionable' only if they cause injury to competitors.
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Economic theories explaining the gains from liberal trade and from 'separation of policy instruments', or the design of 'optimal interventions' for correcting 'market failures' and for addressing collective action problems in supplying 'public goods', are important for the rational design of many trade regulations. The economic justifications of the GATT legal requirements of using transparent, nondiscriminatory and market-conforming trade policy instruments also serve political and legal 'constitutional functions' for limiting welfare-reducing abuses of discretionary foreign policy, for instance by promoting the constitutional values of non-discrimination, transparent, rules-based policymaking as well as citizen-oriented economic, legal and political integration (e. . 36 Yet, some trade rules (e.g. on safeguards, anti-dumping and countervailing duties) are based on political rather than economic justifications.
The limits of 'trade theories' for explaining trade regulation
The Bretton-Woods Agreements, GATT/WTO law and most other areas of IEL outside Europe are based on utilitarian principles of 'Kaldor-Hicks efficiency' and cost-benefit-analyses aimed at enhancing 'total national welfare' without requiring compensation of the losers from trade or maximization of general consumer welfare (e.g. in the sense of 'Pareto efficiency'); the mere possibility of using the gains from trade for funding a hypothetical compensation scheme is considered to be a sufficient justification even if rulers in many UN member states appropriate much of the 'gains from trade' (e.g. in terms of tariff revenue and 'protection rents') as well as from foreign loans and investment concessions in order to enrich themselves at the expense of general consumer welfare.
According to
Nobel laureate Paul Krugman, '(i)f economists ruled the world, there would be no need for a World Trade Organization. The economist's case for free trade is essentially a unilateral case: a country serves its own interests by pursuing free trade regardless of what other countries may do.'
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Economic theories justifying reciprocal trade liberalization in the context of trade agreements can only partially explain trade rules and institutions. Economic 'terms-of-trade' theories claim that governments negotiate trade agreements in order to protect market access commitments against foreign 'terms-oftrade' manipulation (e.g. by means of export tariffs, which were found to be inconsistent with China's WTO obligations in China-raw materials).
38 According to 'commitment theories', reciprocal trade liberalization commitments are necessary on domestic policy grounds for overcoming political pressures from import-competing producers for 'import protection' by enlisting political support from export industries benefitting from reciprocal trade liberalization (e.g. in terms of additional export opportunities, importation of cheaper inputs). As shown by Ethier and Regan
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, there is little evidence for the claims by 'terms-of-trade' theories  that governments actually engage in systematic 'terms-of-trade manipulation' exploiting 'national market power';
 that they have the knowledge and political support for manipulating international prices through thousands of 'optimum tariff items' aimed at improving terms-of-trade;
 that the terms-of-trade tariff revenue will always outweigh the domestic costs from import protection;
 that terms-of-trade considerations can explain all trade rules (e.g. prohibitions of trade embargoes, export subsidies, and of voluntary export restraints, the injury requirement for safeguard measures, third-party adjudication, etc); and  that 'politically motivated trade protection' distorting domestic prices is 'politically efficient' and therefore not liberalized by reciprocal trade agreements, notwithstanding the fact that trade agreements and trade negotiators tend to focus on reducing politically motivated import protection, 36 On the economic, political and legal reasons underlying the ranking of trade policy instruments in GATT see: F. 
From 'justice as efficiency' to 'constitutional economics' and 'human development'
Economic utilitarianism neglects the impossibility of measuring, comparing and maximizing all human preferences ('utilities') on a single scale. The welfare of a nation, the quality of the life of citizens and their 'life satisfaction' (e.g. in terms of health, education, democratic self-government) cannot be inferred from measuring national income. The political and legal goals of democratic constitutionalism to 'institutionalize public reason' for the benefit of democratic people and their fundamental rights depend less on economic than on political and legal justifications of trade rules, institutions and dispute settlement systems, for instance in terms of limiting abuses of political and private power. From a constitutional perspective, people are the real wealth of a nation; the objective of development 'should be to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives'.
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Constitutional economists (like Nobel Prize laureate J. Buchanan) criticize the 'constitutional ignorance' of neoclassical welfare economics and trade theory, for instance their often unrealistic assumptions of perfect knowledge and perfect competition, factor mobility at zero transaction costs, 'optimal' government corrections of market failures, and authoritarian definitions of 'social welfare functions' by aggregating diverse individual preferences. 42 Constitutional economists emphasize not only (like institutional economists) the functional dependence of efficient market competition on liberty rights (e.g., freedom of profession, freedom of contract, freedom of consumer choice), property rights (e.g., in savings, investments and traded goods), non-discriminatory market access rights (e.g., as in EU law), institutions (like a stable currency) and legal security (e.g., pacta sunt servanda, due process of law, access to courts) as legal preconditions for efficient agreements on market transactions and reduction of transaction costs. They also argue that people can realize mutual gains not only from voluntary contracts in economic markets, but also from constitutional contracts in political markets that enable citizens to 40 Cf. M. Cremona, International Regulatory Policy and Democratic Accountability : The EU and the ACTA, in:
Cremona/Hilpold/Lavranos/Schneider/Ziegler (eds), Reflections on the Constitutionalisation of International Economic Law -Liber Amicorum for Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (Leiden: Nijhoff, 2014), at 155. 41 Human Development Report 2010 (New York: UNDP, 2010) 1. The report reaffirms a broad definition of 'human development (as) the expansion of people's freedoms to live long, healthy and creative lives; to advance other goals they have reason to value; and to engage actively in shaping development equitably and sustainably on a shared planet. People are both the beneficiaries and the drivers of human development, as individuals and in groups' (at 2). 42 Cf. Petersmann (note 4), at 377 ff. escape from 'prisoner dilemmas'. By placing constitutional liberties and other agreed core values (like monetary stability) beyond the power of majoritarian politics, and by protecting a decentralized 'private law society' based on voluntary cooperation, constitutional citizen rights and open markets facilitate individual consent to the basic constitutional rules.
The dialectic evolution of IEL: towards a 'Geneva consensus' (P.Lamy)?
The transformation of international investment law (discussed in section V), global health governance (section VI) and of regional economic integration law (e.g. by 'mega-regional' FTAs like the EU's transatlantic free trade agreements with Canada and the USA) confirms that -due to the rational egoism ('fast thinking') of economic actors and their limited reasonableness ('slow thinking'), as discussed in section I -IEL tends to evolve through dialectic 'learning processes' based on  regionalism (such as the today more than 600 FTAs) and  global multilateralism (e.g. in the context of GATT and WTO agreements).
'Fragmentation' and progressive 're-integration' of international law are legally interconnected rather than separate dynamics aimed at reforming international law, for instance by interpreting treaties 'in conformity with the principles of justice and international law', including 'human rights and fundamental freedoms for all' and other 'relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties' (Preamble and Article 31 VCLT). Due to the self-interests of government executives in limiting their legal and judicial accountability, legal interpretations advanced by citizens and impartial courts of justice often differ from those of UN and WTO diplomats prioritizing their own rights in UN and WTO legal instruments. Debates on 'fragmentation' and 'constitutionalization' of international law differ depending on whether the legal contexts are controlled by national and international courts (e.g. deciding on national tobacco control litigation) or by government executives attempting to exclude legal and judicial accountability vis-à-vis adversely affected citizens (e.g. by submitting investor-state disputes to secretive arbitration, or by excluding 'direct applicability' of FTA rules by citizens in domestic courts). From the perspective of reasonable citizens as 'democratic principals' who must hold all governance agents legally, democratically and judicially accountable, the limitation of the 'collective action problems' of transnational 'aggregate PGs' (like public health protection and a mutually beneficial world trading system) requires supplementing 'republican constitutionalism' for collective supply of national PGs by 'cosmopolitan constitutionalism' for multilevel governance of transnational aggregate PGs. In conformity with the 'systemic integration' requirements of the customary rules of treaty interpretation and adjudication (cf. Article 31:3,c VCLT), the human rights obligations of all UN member states contribute to a progressive transformation of IEL and of its state-centered 'Washington consensus' towards a more citizen-oriented 'Geneva consensus', as it underlies UN HRL and the more citizen-oriented governance of international PGs by UN human rights bodies and UN Specialized Agencies like the ILO, WHO and other organizations at Geneva.
Multilevel governance and 'regulatory competition'
The functional interrelationships of local, national, regional and worldwide governance of 'aggregate PGs' are well reflected in IEL. -explained why the constitutional legitimacy of multilevel economic regulation should be enhanced by interpreting the multilevel guarantees of equal freedoms, non-discrimination, rule of law and access to justice in national, regional and worldwide economic law in mutually coherent ways for the benefit of citizens and their constitutional rights in domestic legal systems. Such 'mutually consistent interpretations' enhance the legal and judicial accountability of multilevel governance agents that are often inadequately controlled by citizens, civil society, parliaments and courts of justice and fail to effectively protect PGs demanded by citizens).
rights-based, regional common markets and integration law; their 'enabling', 'legitimating', 'enforcement' and 'republican functions' (e.g. as decentralized means for limiting implementation deficits of PGs regimes) and 'derivative nature' (i.e. being linked to state citizenship rather than to human rights) are increasingly recognized also in African, Latin American and Central American integration regimes.
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The vital role of international trade in generating economic growth, reducing unnecessary poverty, promoting peaceful cooperation (e.g. for tackling many other challenges of globalization) and empowering citizens to limit 'governance failures' reflects the national and regional experiences of all countries that creation of national and regional common markets is the most important 'engine of growth' and of peaceful, social transformation provided trade opening remains embedded into citizenoriented, rights-based 'republican constitutionalism' as it has evolved -through centuries of 'trials and errors' -since the ancient city republics in Greece and Italy more than 2500 years ago. Sections V-VI illustrate this need for reforming and adjusting interdependent PGs regimes through multilevel protection of republican rights of citizens by discussing recent changes in international investment law and global health law. Section VII concludes by identifying similarities and differences among 'republican constitutionalism' aimed at promoting 'republican virtues' and protecting civil and political rights against abuses of state powers, including Chinese political traditions of linking the mandates of political rulers to respect for 'social citizenship rights'.
Legal fragmentation: how to reconcile investment law and adjudication with human rights?
Until the ICJ judgment in the ELSI dispute 45 , most international investment disputes were decided either by recourse to domestic courts or by diplomatic protection of the foreign investor by the home state which, occasionally, submitted the dispute to international courts like the ICJ or its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice. Yet, as illustrated by the ELSI judgment delivered by the ICJ more than 25 years after the dispute arose between the US investor and the local authorities in Sicily, most foreign investors perceive prior exhaustion of local remedies in national courts -followed by 'politicized', lengthy and costly procedures of diplomatic protection and disputes among states in international courts -as inadequate legal and judicial safeguards of investor rights. Also other investment disputes in the ICJ -like the 2007, 2010 and 2012 judgments in the Diallo dispute -illustrated the limited jurisdiction (e.g. due to narrow interpretations of the customary law rules on 'effective nationality' and diplomatic protection of company shareholders), long duration (i.e. more than 20 years) and inadequate remedies of the ICJ for deciding complex investment and human rights disputes.
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The transformation of international investment law through investment treaties and arbitration
The transformation of international investment law from a 'Westphalian' into a more 'cosmopolitan system' evolved since the 1960s in essentially five phases:
 Since the conclusion of the first bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between Germany and Pakistan in 1959, the number of BITs has dynamically increased to now more than 3.000 agreements. Yet, 44 On the increasing recognition of transnational economic, labor, social and and political citizenship rights (e.g. in the EU, the EEA, the Andean Community, MERCOSUR, the Central American Common Market, the constitutional and human rights in non-discriminatory ways without privileging powerful corporate interests and their constituencies (including arbitrators from big law firms advising TNCs and accounting for a large part of ISDS arbitrators). 50 Also the CETA provisions excluding private rights and domestic judicial remedies under CETA (Article 14.16) and 'out-sourcing' investor-state disputes to transnational arbitration are criticized for discriminating against domestic citizens and circumventing domestic constitutional restraints, as illustrated by the only marginal role of HRL in most investor-state arbitrations. In a recent legal opinion, also the German federation of judges concluded that EU law neither authorizes nor justifies (e.g. in view of the better legal qualifications and greater independence of national and EU courts than arbitral bodies) excluding national and EU courts from reviewing whether national and EU governments violated their legal obligations and rule of law vis-à-vis foreign investors.
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How to reconcile investment law with HRL?
Most BITs and most ISDS awards continue to be silent on HRL. Yet, the human rights obligations of all UN member states, the increasing civil society criticism of the one-sided focus of BITs and ISDS on protecting investor rights rather than regulatory duties of states, and the increasing jurisprudence of European courts and human rights bodies on constitutional and human rights restraints of investor rights prompt an increasing number of references to human rights in ISDS at the request of complainants, host states, third parties and arbitrators. The inclusion of ISDS into modern FTAs, the revision of some model BITs, and the increasing number of third party interventions in ISDS are prompting increasing references to HRL, e.g. in the Preamble to the 2014 CETA and in ISDS awards involving EU member countries. 52 There are also investment-related disputes in regional human rights bodies like the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), or the African Human Rights Commission, as well as ISDS awards referring to the proportionality methods used by regional human rights courts (e.g. for determining the amount of compensation). Also less-developed countries argue for reassessing and reforming BITs so as to protect the regulatory duties of states to protect the human rights of their population.
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The 'causes of action' in most ISDS procedures are limited to investor claims of violations of investment law; the national and international applicable law in ISDS, however, may include human rights, for instance as relevant context for interpreting BIT provisions on FET. Even though BITs and ISDS tribunals rarely refer to HR arguments, third party submissions increasingly do so (e.g. in case of investments related to public services like supply of water, health services and electricity). In contrast to the integration of HRL and investment law in EU law, the main reasons underlying the separate evolution of investment law and HRL outside the EU are bound to continue, such as:
 state sovereignty and freedom of contract are invoked by powerful actors in order to pursue strategic self-interests (e.g. 'national interests' in exploiting power asymmetries through BITs);
 HRL and the more than 100 regional and UN human rights instruments protect diverse, individual and democratic conceptions of the values and hierarchies of legal systems (e.g. monism v dualism, 50 Cf. E.U.  the inalienable and indivisible character of civil, political, economic, social and cultural human rights requires taking into account the similar goals of HRL and investment law (e.g. the common goal of protecting the right to property, rule of law and 'balancing' of competing rights);
 also other principles of justice require piecemeal reforms of IEL through clarification (e.g. in new BITs, FTAs and ISDS) of sovereign rights and duties to protect public interests as defined by HRL and related 'principles of justice', including principles of procedural justice (e.g. access to justice), distributive justice (e.g. human rights, sovereign equality of states), corrective justice (e.g. compensation), commutative justice (e.g. agreed bargains in concession contracts) and equity (e.g. unforeseen emergency situations).
The different perspectives of investors, home and host states, amici curiae and judges in ISDS
Human rights arguments can be introduced into ISDS in diverse ways:
 by the investor/complainant, either as a natural person or as corporate actor, as victim 54 ;
 by the defendant/host state as victim/protector of human rights (e.g. in arbitration proceedings challenging tobacco control measures aimed at protecting the human right to health, challenges of governmental termination of public service concessions on grounds of inadequate protection of access to water);
 by the home state invoking his extraterritorial obligations to avoid human rights violations by foreign investors incorporated in the home state;
 by other third parties (e.g. NAFTA member states invoking Article 1128 of the NAFTA Agreement enabling third party interventions, submissions by amici curiae)
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; or  by the arbitrators ex officio, for instance in the rare cases where the arbitrators referred to the 'proportionality balancing' of human rights tribunals 56 or justified their admission of amici curiae briefs because the dispute may raise 'complex public and international law questions, including human rights considerations'. tribunals have emphasized that the 'consistent interpretation' requirements cannot override BIT provisions (except in case of jus cogens), and that HRL and investment law 'are not inconsistent, contradictory, or mutually exclusive. Thus … Argentina could have respected both types of obligations'. 58 Human rights were recognized as relevant context for interpreting investment rules or concession contracts, for instance when Tanzania terminated an investment contract on provision of water services in view of the poor performance of the investor that undermined the rights of citizens of access to water. 59 The legal admissibility and relevance of HR arguments depend on the limited jurisdiction and applicable law in ISDS. In the Biloune and Rompetrol arbitrations, for example, the tribunal applied investment rules rather than the human rights provisions (e.g. regarding personal freedom, access to justice) invoked by the complainants. Tribunals also remain reluctant to discuss human rights arguments that are only invoked by third parties and which the tribunal may consider to be not at issue among the parties. 60 In the rare cases of complaints that investments were made in violation of human rights, the tribunal may have to examine whether its limited jurisdiction also covers 'bad faith investments', or whether allegations of human rights violations are inadmissible (e.g. on grounds of the 'clean hands doctrine') if the host state has colluded in human rights violations.
HRL may be relevant context for clarifying vague BIT standards (e.g. on 'fair and equitable treatment' and 'adequate compensation'), inadequately defined 'due process' requirements of arbitral procedures, and 'judicial balancing' methodologies for reconciling public and private interests. 61 Investment arbitrators may, however, prefer to avoid controversial human rights arguments (e.g. on 'corporate social responsibilities' and human rights obligations of corporations) that risk leading to the 'annulment' of arbitration awards and render mutually agreed dispute settlements more difficult. In Glamis Gold v USA, the arbitrators avoided explicit discussion of the human rights arguments but effectively protected the indigenous peoples' rights invoked by the defendant and third parties. 62 The judicial reasoning may remain the same regardless of whether the host state justifies the national measure concerned by invoking human rights or the corresponding 'public interests' and 'duties to protect' (e.g. public health and access to water). Similarly, the judicial findings may not change if the complainant justifies his investor rights as also having a human rights core. There are, however, a number of investment disputes submitted by the investor to both investment arbitration as well as to regional human rights courts 63 , or by third parties to regional human rights bodies (e.g. requesting protection of land rights of indigenous people by the IACtHR). 64 So far, no state seems to have used ISDS (e.g. pursuant to Article 36 ICSID) for suing an investor for violation of human rights obligations; domestic administrative and criminal law sanctions usually offer the host state more effective, alternative means of dispute settlement.
How to reconcile health law and IEL with HRL? the example of multilevel tobacco control litigation
IEL has existed since ancient times. Multilateral health law and HRL, by contrast, developed only after World War II in the context of the UN, the WHO and regional organizations. Apart from multiple nonbinding resolutions, strategies and codes of practice, the WHO has negotiated only three health agreements: the International Health Regulations, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), and the Health Nomenclature Regulations.
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Worldwide recognition of rights to health protection
Virtually all UN member states are members of the WHO and have recognized, e.g. in the 1946 WHO Constitution, 'the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health (as) one the fundamental rights of every human being' (Preamble) and objective of the WHO (Article 1). Through their ratification of the 1966 UN Covenants on civil and political rights (= ICCPR) and economic, social and cultural rights (= ICESCR), more than 160 UN member states have also recognized the 'right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health' as codified in numerous human rights instruments (e.g. Article 12 ICESCR) as well as additional human rights (like rights to life, civil and political freedoms, access to food, housing, water, education, employment and a clean environment) that are social determinants of health and promote social engagement and political accountability in health protection policies. Both 'General Comment 14' elaborated by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and 'General Comment 15' elaborated by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child adopted a 'holistic approach' that recognizes such related human rights as 'integral components of the right to health', thereby emphasizing the synergies (also of not explicitly mentioned rights like access to water and sanitation) with private and public health protection. The rights-based approach has facilitated successful regulation and litigation for health protection in many countries and the proliferation of non-governmental foundations (e.g. the Gates Foundation supporting AIDS medication), stakeholder constituencies (like pharmaceutical industry and trade associations) and private-public partnerships cooperating in multilevel health protection activities.
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The WTO complaints against Australia's legislation on 'plain-packaging' of tobacco products
The WHO dispute settlement provisions for access to the ICJ and the Permanent Court of Arbitration have only rarely been used for settling health related disputes. Tobacco companies and tobacco exporting countries prefer challenging tobacco control measures in trade and investment jurisdictions that may be less inclined to prioritize HRL and health law over economic rights and IEL. In 2012/2013, five WTO members (Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Indonesia, Ukraine) requested consultations and, subsequently, the establishment of dispute settlement panels in order to review the WTO consistency of certain Australian measures concerning trademarks, geographical indications and other plain packaging requirements applicable to tobacco products and packaging. 67 According to the complainants, Australia's plain packaging measures are inconsistent with Australia's WTO obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement and the GATT 1994, especially:
 Article 20 of the TRIPS Agreement: Australia unjustifiably encumbers the use of trademarks for tobacco products in the course of trade through special requirements (e.g. that trademarks relating to tobacco products be used in a special form and in a manner which is detrimental to their capability to distinguish tobacco products of one undertaking from tobacco products of other undertakings);  Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement: Australia imposes technical regulations that accord to imported tobacco products treatment less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin;
 Article 2.2. of the TBT Agreement: Australia imposes technical regulations that create unnecessary obstacles to trade and are more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective taking into account the risks that non-fulfilment would create;
 Article III:4 of GATT 1994: Australia accords to imported tobacco products treatment less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin;
 Article IX:4 of GATT 1994: Australia imposes requirements relating to the marking of imported cigar products which materially reduce their value and/or unreasonably increase their cost of production.
In view of the systemic legal issues concerning the balance between health and other interests in tobacco regulation, more than 61 third WTO members (including the EU and 28 EU member states) requested to join the consultations and to intervene as third parties in the WTO panel proceedings. In April 2014, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) established five panels on the basis of a 'Procedural Agreement between Australia and Ukraine, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Cuba and Indonesia' providing for the composition by the WTO Director-General of the same 3 panelists for each of the 5 panels and for the harmonization of the timetables for each of the five panel proceedings. In May 2014, the DirectorGeneral announced the composition of the panels. In view of the exceptional legal complexity and involvement of more than 65 WTO members, the Panel later announced that it expected to be able to conclude these five parallel panel proceedings not before 2016. Judging from past GATT/WTO jurisprudence, there appear to be good reasons to assume that the panel will dismiss all the abovementioned legal challenges of Australia's plain packaging legislation.
 If Australia can prove its claim that its plain packaging laws (e.g. prohibiting the use of promotional colors, graphics and logos on tobacco products and allowing the identification of brands and variants only in a standardized font, color and size) apply on a non-discriminatory basis to all tobacco products from all countries including Australia, there will be no violations of Article 2.1 TBT Agreement or Article III:4 GATT. This dispute seems to differ from previous tobacco control disputes in GATT and the WTO, where the USA was found to violate Article 2.1 TBT Agreement because of its discrimination between prohibited clove cigarettes (mainly imported from Indonesia) and domestic 'like products' (menthol cigarettes mainly produced in the USA) 68 , or where GATT-inconsistent import restrictions of tobacco products were found to be not 'necessary' for health protection (in terms of Article XX(b) GATT) in view of the lack of restrictions on domestic tobacco products. 69  If Australia can prove its claim that the WHO FCTC is an 'international standard' in terms of Article 2.2 TBT whose incorporation into Australia's plain packaging regulations has already contributed to reducing tobacco consumption in Australia, there is also a presumption that Australia's plain packaging regulations are 'not more trade-restrictive than necessary' to fulfill a legitimate health protection objective as permitted by Article 2.2 TBT Agreement. The WTO panel could also follow the jurisprudence of the EFTA Court by recognizing that -even if evidencebased, scientific studies on the empirical impact of specific tobacco control measures should not yet be available -governments cannot be prevented from exercising their regulatory duty to protect public health by non-discriminatory tobacco control measures which 'by their nature' are suitable to limit, 'at least in the long run, the consumption of tobacco products'. Agreement. Yet, according to past WTO and also EU jurisprudence, the Paris Convention and Article 16 TRIPS Agreement confer on trademark owners only a 'negative right' to prevent unauthorized third parties from using the registered trademark. 71 The EC-Trademarks Panel emphasized that 'a fundamental feature of intellectual property protection inherently grants Members freedom to pursue legitimate public policy objectives since many measures to attain the public policy objectives lie outside the scope of intellectual property and do not require an exception under the TRIPS Agreement'. 72 Similarly, the Advocate General in the CJEU dispute on the validity on the Tobacco Products Directive stated that 'the essential substance of a trademark right does not consist in an entitlement as against the authorities to use a trademark unimpeded by provisions of public law. On the contrary, a trademark right is essentially a right enforceable against other individuals if they infringe the use made by the holder'. 73 It appears unlikely, therefore, that Article 20 TRIPS Agreement can be construed as o protecting a more comprehensive 'positive right' to use a trademark that limits the sovereign right to 'adopt measures necessary to protect public health' (Article 8 TRIPS Agreement);
o that such a positive, private right could override 'justifiable encumbrance' for public health reasons notwithstanding the recognition in Article 7 TRIPS Agreement of the need to protect intellectual property rights 'in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations'; or o that the complainants can rebut a legal presumption that Australia's implementation of the WHO FCTC does not 'unjustifiably encumber' the 'use of a trademark in the course of trade'.
As the Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement recognize sovereign rights to refuse registration and limit use of trademarks on non-economic grounds, and WTO practice and jurisprudence recognize protection of human life and health as 'both vital and important in the highest degree' 74 , non-discriminatory plain packaging requirements in conformity with the WHO FCTC regulations are also unlikely to distort competition or violate any other TRIPS provisions. As stated in the 2001 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, the TRIPS Agreement 'can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Member's right to protect public health'.
75
'Balancing methods' used in WTO tobacco control disputes
In US -Clove Cigarettes, the Appellate Body noted: 'The balance set out in the preamble of the TBT Agreement between, on the one hand, the desire to avoid creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade and, on the other hand, the recognition of Members' right to regulate, is not, in principle, different from the balance, set out in the GATT 1994, where obligations such as national treatment in Article III are qualified by the general exceptions provision of Article XX.' 76 Hence, as sovereign rights 'to protect public health' and 'promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to socio-economic development' are recognized in numerous WTO provisions (like Article 8 TRIPS Agreement), the dispute over Australia's tobacco regulations offers an important opportunity to further clarify to what extent the legal methodology for ensuring 'a balance of rights and obligations' (Article 7 TRIPS Agreement) and 'security and predictability in the multilateral trading system' (Article 3 DSU) in the context of the TBT and TRIPS Agreements must follow the WTO jurisprudence on the 'necessity test' in WTO exception clauses like GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV by considering  'the relevant factors, particularly the importance of the interests or values at stake, the extent of the contribution to the achievement of the measure's objective, and its trade restrictiveness. If this analysis yields a preliminary conclusion that the measure is necessary, this result must be confirmed by comparing the measure with possible alternatives… This comparison should be carried out in the light of the importance of the interests or values at stake.'
 'It rests upon the complaining Member to identify possible alternatives… (I)n order to qualify as an alternative, a measure… must be not only less trade restrictive than the measure at issue, but should also "preserve for the responding Member its right to achieve its desired level of protection with respect to the objective pursued" … If the responding Member demonstrates that the measure proposed… is not a genuine alternative or is not 'reasonably available', … the measure at issue is necessary'. 78 From the perspective of the customary law requirements to interpret treaties and settle related disputes 'in conformity with principles of justice and international law', the judicial reconciliation ('balancing') of economic freedoms with public health protection should not be prejudged by 'forum shopping' among competing jurisdictions, or by 'rules shopping' regarding specific WTO agreements using 'objectives' (like the Preamble of the TBT Agreement, Article 7 TRIPS Agreement), 'principles' (like Article 8 TRIPS Agreement), 'basic rights' (as in Article 2 SPS Agreement), general treaty provisions (like Article 2 TBT Agreement) or 'exceptions' (like Articles XX GATT, XIV GATS) for protecting sovereign rights of WTO members and corresponding rights of citizens to health protection. National courts tend to 'balance' economic and health rights on the basis of constitutional principles of nondiscrimination, good faith, necessity and proportionality of governmental restrictions. Also regional and WTO dispute settlement jurisdictions must interpret IEL 'in conformity with principles of justice' and 'human rights and fundamental freedoms' as accepted by all WTO members. The differences among the applicable laws in different jurisdictions may entail different procedures (e.g. regarding burden of proof, judicial standards of review) and legitimately different interpretations of HRL, constitutional laws, health law and IEL. 79 The WTO panel should therefore repeat and clarify in respect of the TRIPS Agreement what the Appellate Body has already indicated with regard to the TBT Agreement, i.e. that the legal and judicial 'balancing methods' for interpreting specific WTO agreements should proceed from the same 'principles of justice' that underlie WTO law as well as the human rights obligations of WTO members, i.e.:
3. Impact on economic rights? As non-discriminatory product and packaging requirements are unlikely to distort international trade and competition (e.g. among competing trademarks), the weighing and balancing of their impact on economic rights with their contribution to reducing tobacco advertising and tobacco consumption seem to be consistent with 'a balance of rights and obligations' that is 'conducive to social and economic welfare' (as required by Article 7 TRIPS Agreement) and to avoid 'unnecessary obstacles to international trade' (as required by GATT and the TBT Agreement);
Reasonably available alternatives?
The WHO FCTC and its ratification by 177 countries confirm the view expressed also by the WTO Appellate Body that 'certain complex public health or environmental problems may be tackled only with a comprehensive policy comprising a multiplicity of interacting measures'. 82 As '(s)ubstituting one element of this comprehensive policy for another would weaken the policy by reducing the synergies between its components, as well as its total effect' 83 , the WTO and WHO principles of preserving for each WTO and WHO member 'its right to achieve its desired level of protection with respect to the (health) objective pursued' 84 should prevail in both WTO and WHO law, as suggested also by Article 31:3 VCLT.
The 'integration' and 'consistent interpretation' requirements of the customary rules of treaty interpretation must not be rendered ineffective by the fact that -in view of the non-state WTO members -no UN treaty has the same membership as WTO agreements. From the perspective of citizens and their human rights, legitimate legal, democratic and judicial 'balancing' of economic and non-economic rules must remain justifiable by an inclusive 'reasonable equilibrium' rather than merely by 'instrumental rationality' of diplomats and economists. The criteria of reasonableness and their respective weight may differ depending on the concrete circumstances (e.g. in WTO disputes among members that have accepted the same UN legal obligations and relevant legal context for interpreting WTO rules and principles like 'sustainable development'). Democracies should promote consumer welfare through trade liberalization, trade regulation, protection of human rights and compliance with UN and WTO agreements ratified by parliaments for the benefit of citizens even without reciprocity by foreign countries that are less committed to protecting human rights.
Administration of justice in investor-state tobacco disputes?
In 2010, at the request of several Philip Morris affiliates registered in Switzerland, the ICSID established an investor-state arbitral tribunal so as to examine whether Uruguay's tobacco packaging measures of 2009 were consistent with Uruguay's obligations under a BIT with Switzerland. 85 Previously, the Philip Morris affiliates had challenged the regulations in Uruguay's domestic courts, but the Supreme Court upheld them as constitutional. In July 2013, the ICSID arbitral tribunal decided that it had jurisdiction to hear this case and instructed the parties to prepare substantive arguments. 86 A final decision is expected for 2015.
In 2012, Philip Morris Asia (PMA) commenced arbitral proceedings pursuant to UNCITRAL arbitration rules against Australia challenging the consistency of Australia's plain packaging regulations with Australia's legal obligations under a BIT between Hong Kong and Australia, using the Permanent Court of Arbitration as registry. 87 According to PMA, the plain packaging regulations -by mandating every aspect of the retail packaging of tobacco products including the appearance, size and shape of tobacco 82 Appellate Body Report on Brazil-Retreaded Tyres (note 77), para. 151. 83 Appellate Body Report on Brazil-Retreaded Tyres (note 77), para. 172. 84 Cf. note 77 above. packaging, prohibiting the use of trade marks, symbols, graphic and other images, and mandating that brand names and variants must be printed in a specified font and size against a uniform drab brown background -virtually eliminate its branded business by expropriating intellectual property, transforming it from a manufacturer of branded products to a manufacturer of commoditized products with the consequential effect of substantially diminishing the value of PMA's investments in Australia. In April 2014, the arbitral tribunal issued Procedural Order No. 8 granting Australia's request to have the proceedings bifurcated between arguments on jurisdiction and arguments on the merits. According to Australia, the tribunal lacks jurisdiction on three grounds:  First, Australia alleges that PMA's investment in Australia was not admitted in accordance with the BIT because PMA's statutory notice pursuant to Australia's foreign investment rules contained false and misleading assertions as to the purpose of the investment. Australia alleges that PMA's true purpose -that should have been stated on the statutory notice -was to place itself in a position where it could bring this claim under the BIT.
 Secondly, Australia alleges that PMA's claim falls outside the BIT because it relates to a preexisting dispute; or, alternatively, that it amounts to an abuse of right because PMA re-structured its investments with the express purpose of bringing this claim, after the Australian government had announced its intention to implement plain packaging.
 Thirdly, Australia alleges that PMA's assets -being only its shares in Philip Morris companies registered in Australia -are not 'investments' in Hong Kong that enjoy the protection of the BIT.
The tribunal ruled that Australia's first and second jurisdictional arguments should be bifurcated and be heard at a jurisdictional meeting in February 2015. The third jurisdictional argument should be joined with the merits. As PMA had acquired its interest in Philip Morris Australia only some 10 months after Australia's plain packaging measures were announced, and the tobacco industries acknowledged their support for the simultaneous WTO complaints against Australia's plain packaging measures, the parallel complaints in specialized investment and WTO jurisdictions increased widespread concerns against globally integrated tobacco companies. For, by using their enormous financial resources for multilevel litigation strategies based on 'forum shopping', 'rules-shopping' and legal restructuring of multinational companies so as to use investor-state jurisdictions under the most favorable BIT, tobacco companies could delay tobacco control measures and threaten notably less-developed countries with litigation risks, related costs and 'regulatory chill'. As regards the substantive complaints, Australia has rejected each of them, notably  that the Australian packaging requirements amount to expropriation of the investments by PMA, which justify compensation claims in the order of 'billions' of dollars (e.g. by undermining the 'brand value' based on the 'Marlboro' trademark);
 that Australia failed to provide these investments 'fair and equitable treatment' and 'unreasonably impaired' the investments; and  that Australia failed to accord the investments 'full protection and security'.
As claimed by Australia, in an unpublished decision of December 2015, the tribunal declined its jurisdiction for the complaint. The claims appear to have been unfounded also on the merits. Australia emphasized the non-discriminatory nature of its plain packaging regulations and their justification by public health reasons and the 'police powers exception' recognized in international investment law. It remains contested whether -in international investment law -the 'proportionality principle' requires 'balancing' the regulatory 'public interest' with the investor's private property in order to determine the lawfulness of 'regulatory takings'. The support expressed by both the WHO and by the FCTC Secretariat for Australia's plain packing regulations lends support to Australia's claim that plain packaging is a justifiable and proportionate means for reducing the adverse health effects of tobacco products. Moreover, as PMA knew Australia's intention to introduce plain packaging legislation at the time when PMA acquired shares in Philip Morris' affiliates in Australia, PMA cannot claim to have had 'legitimate expectations' at the time of its investments in Australia that such tobacco control measures would not be introduced. Another question related to whether the arbitral tribunal should -as a matter of judicial comity -take into account the judgment by the Australian High Court on the negative nature of trademarks, the lack of a 'taking' and 'acquisition' in terms of Australian law (which differs from the BIT context), as well as the judgment in the dispute launched by Philip Morris against Uruguay (e.g. on whether registration of a trademark in a particular country gives rise to an 'investment', whether plain packaging of cigarettes can amount to 'expropriation' or violation of the 'fair and equitable treatment' obligation, or whether BIT 'umbrella clauses' can transform WTO obligations into applicable law in the investment dispute). Even if Australia's position that plain packaging amounts to non-compensable regulation rather than compensable expropriation of trademarks of tobacco companies had been overruled by the investment tribunal, PMA might have found it difficult to enforce such an award in view of the 'execution immunity' of foreign state property serving public functions ('jure imperii' rather than 'jure gestionis').
Outlook: Learning from republican and democratic constitutionalism for multilevel governance of PGs
The 70th anniversary of the UN and the 20th anniversary of the WTO in 2015 call for reviewing why the UN and so many other international organizations fail -in so many UN member states -to realize their declared objectives of protecting human rights, sustainable development and other PGs. Since the ancient Greek and Italian city republics 2500 year ago, republican constitutionalism has turned outthrough centuries of political 'trials and errors' -to provide the most effective legal and governance framework for collective supply of PGs. The universal recognition of human rights -by protecting individual and democratic freedoms and development of human capacities -reinforces civil society claims for cosmopolitan citizenship rights and 'democratization' of multilevel governance of regional common markets and other PGs. 88 Collective protection of most international PGs -such as human rights, transnational rule of law, sustainable development and 'democratic peace' -depends on rulesbased cooperation and welfare-increasing division of labor. The preceding overview of methodological problems of IEL and adjudication reveals the need for a thorough reexamination of the legal foundations of UN and WTO law. For instance:
 As no single state can unilaterally protect international 'aggregate PGs' without international law and institutions, globalization has transformed state Constitutions into 'partial constitutions'. The unnecessary poverty of 2 billion of people living on 2$ or less per day without effective access to human rights illustrates that the 'disconnected UN and WTO governance' and the large number of authoritarian rulers without democratic legitimacy disempower citizens and undermine their constitutional rights as 'constituent powers'. UN/WTO governance must be rendered more consistent with the 'network conceptions' underlying IEL and the global division of labor (e.g. 'global supply chains') so that citizens -as main economic actors and 'democratic principals' -can hold 'constituted governance powers' legally, democratically and judicially more accountable for abuses of power. The historical lessons from 'republican constitutionalism' suggest that the private and public, national and international levels of IEL must be 're-connected' through cosmopolitan rights and judicial remedies empowering citizens to hold multilevel governance institutions legally, democratically and judicially more accountable for 'governance failures' and neglect for human rights.
 Citizens -as 'agents of justice' and 'constituent powers' that must define 'principles of justice' through constitutional contracts and 'access to justice' -must assume more 'cosmopolitan responsibilities' for protecting the functional unity of IEL in terms of human rights and republican 88 On the diverse legal traditions of republicanism and the disagreement on whether the core values of republicanism should be defined in terms of liberty, republican virtues of active citizenry finding self-realization in political participation and collective supply of PGs, communitarianism, social and political equality, or deliberative democracy, see: S.  'Fragmentation' (as protected by human and democratic autonomy, state sovereignty) and 'legal re-integration' (e.g. pursuant to the 'systemic integration' principle in Article 31:3 VCLT) are dialectic characteristics of all complex legal systems. Also the hundreds of FTAs and WTO/FTA dispute settlement proceedings on peaceful cooperation among states -like the thousands of BITs and investment disputes, and the hundreds of constitutional and human rights instruments promoting individual 'access to justice' and welfare-enhancing cooperation among citizens -are legally inevitable for adjusting international trade and investment law to the demands of citizens for more social justice. Comparative institutionalism explains why decentralized economic, democratic and judicial governance processes must constitutionally limit majoritarian politics at national and international levels (e.g. opportunistic majority politics undermining rule of law in Greece, veto-powers undermining UN and WTO governance). For instance, the 'Kadi jurisprudence' of the CJEU has demonstrated why even UN Security Council 'smart sanctions' against alleged terrorists must remain subject to multilevel judicial review and judicial protection of human rights. 89 The customary law requirement of interpreting treaties and settling related disputes 'in conformity with the principles of justice and international', including 'human rights and fundamental freedoms for all' (Preamble and Article 31 VCLT), recalls the need for reconciling state-centered 'principles of justice' (e.g. in IEL among sovereign states) with citizencentered 'principles of justice' (e.g. in the commercial and private law dimensions of IEL and the transnational investor-state dimensions of IEL). Due to the domination of UN/WTO governance by self-interested governments, the needed 'constitutionalization of IEL' requires judicial administration of justice and democratic struggles by citizens so as to better protect human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.
 Impartial courts of justice tend to be the only branch of government that has to justify its decisions transparently on the basis of 'principles of justice' as independent 'exemplars of public reason' (J.Rawls). Multilevel trade and investment courts interpreting 'treaty standards' (e.g. on 'necessity' of governmental emergency measures in the Argentine economic crisis) increasingly refer to citizen-oriented 'general principles of law' (e.g. principles of proportionality balancing and human rights) rather than to standards of customary international law on reciprocal relations among sovereign states. 90 Yet, government executives often remain eager to maintain their diplomatic privileges and limit their judicial accountability vis-à-vis citizens, for instance As 'state sovereignty' derives its legitimacy from protecting 'individual sovereignty' and 'democratic sovereignty' as defined through human rights, the different levels of democratic self-government -like constitutional, participatory, deliberative and representative, parliamentary democracy -and legal and judicial protection of cosmopolitan rights must be legally protected also in multilevel governance of PGs.
From the 'mandate of heaven' to 'constitutional functions' of IEL in China?
Since the ancient teachings of Taoism and Confucianism, Chinese political culture continues to be deeply concerned with morality, virtues, fairness and socio-economic justice as preconditions for keeping people content with the government. 91 The recognition of collective rights of peoples to a decent livelihood -and of economic welfare as a condition of a government's legitimacy -have a long tradition in Chinese political thought. The mandate of heaven required benevolent virtues of the ruler, economic welfare and consent by the people; economic subsistence rights were considered to be more important than civil and democratic rights against state power as defined by American and European constitutionalism. 92 Hence, the 'mandate of heaven' of Chinese emperors could ultimately justify also rebellion by impoverished people as heaven's way of removing immoral rulers. Yet, Chinese conceptions of 'rights' and 'judicial review' remain fundamentally different from American and European constitutionalism. When my book on 'Constitutional Functions and Constitutional Problems of International Economic Law' (1991) was published in Chinese language in 2004, my Chinese students explained the interest in this book on the following two grounds:
 When China was formally accepted as a WTO member in November 2001, the official newspaper of the Chinese government (the 'People's Daily') had described China's WTO accession as a historic event with a far-reaching impact on the economic development and social progress in the new millennium. Similar to my historical and legal explanations of the 'constitutional functions' of customs unions for the creation of common markets and economic welfare in federal states (like the USA, Germany, Switzerland) and among the 28 EU member states, it was obvious for Chinese citizens that the GATT/WTO commitments could assist China not only to reform its domestic economy for the benefit of hundreds of millions of poor people by governing the Chinese economy through a more coherent, market-oriented and welfare-creating system of legal rules. At the 10 th anniversary of China's WTO accession in 2011, China's former President Hu Jintao also described the opening-up policy adopted in 1978 as the beginning of a continuing process of opening-up China beyond the economy to multilevel legal regulation of PGs, as confirmed by the more recent government decisions (discussed below) to use WTO legal and dispute settlement rulings for promoting rule of law, multilevel legal coherence and independence of courts of justice also inside China.
similar to its initially reluctant participation in the WTO dispute settlement system and following other BRICS countries (like India), China has hardly engaged in leadership for concluding the Doha Round negotiations since 2001. As China has enormously benefited from the WTO trading, legal and dispute settlement system, it has reasonable self-interests in more actively protecting the global PG of a mutually beneficial world trading system. How could this be done in a credible way in spite of the lack of 'democratic constitutionalism' in China's 'peoples republic'? Can the global 'aggregate PG' of a mutually beneficial world trading system be effectively protected if citizens and people do not protect 'republican constitutionalism' at local and national levels of governance?
Need for protecting a 'peoples republic' beyond state borders in multilevel governance of global 'aggregate PGs'
This contribution has explained the need for 'republican reforms' of multilevel governance so as to protect transnational 'aggregate PGs' more effectively for the benefit of citizens. After having cultivated power-based, imperial political traditions in China without republicanism during more than 3000 years, many modern Chinese citizens and lawyers acknowledge that 'republican constitutionalism' and 'republican virtue politics' (e.g. as advocated by Aristotle) offer important lessons for multilevel governance of transnational PGs for the benefit of citizens also in China in order to protect the human rights and rule of law commitments in China's Constitution and its international legal obligations more effectively. The insistence by the Communist party on exempting its political leadership from constitutional 'checks and balances' reflects the Marxian claim to know absolute truth; it reveals authoritarian 'rule by law' that runs counter to 'republican constitutionalism' protecting citizens, their civil, political, economic, social and cultural freedoms and human rights, and their 'people's republic' against abuses of power, as they exist in all civilizations (including China as illustrated by its unnecessary poverty and 'cultural revolution' prior to its opening-up policies since 1979). Like the 'ancient freedoms' in the Greek and Italian city republics, 'communist freedoms' depend on collective political actions that are inadequately restrained by constitutional and judicial protection of human rights against abuses of power. In all countries, such power politics undermines the social advantages of open markets, global competition and cooperation -not only in the economy but likewise also in the polity.
By linking domestic law reforms to its WTO legal and dispute settlement obligations, China's political rulers have undertaken a first step to submit their political powers to external, self-imposed legal and judicial constraints that promote economic welfare and rule of law for the benefit of all Chinese citizens. This transnational 'rule of law strategy' could even go beyond the 'Westphalian power politics' advocated by EU and US trade diplomats and by most less-developed and least-developed WTO members in the trade policy area. China has not only the economic power (e.g. in terms of domestic market access) to induce other WTO members to take their WTO obligations of transnational rule-oflaw (e.g. as required by Article XVI:4 WTO Agreement), multilevel judicial remedies and 'consistent interpretations' more seriously. The 'WTO plus' obligations in China's Protocol of Accession to the WTO (e.g. in terms of trading rights, intellectual property rights, judicial remedies) also illustrate why China's 'rule of law strategy' could set incentives for other WTO members to further strengthen the multilevel, non-discriminatory nature of the WTO legal, dispute settlement and compliance system for the benefit of citizens worldwide. Such transformation of alleged 'discrimination against China' (in terms of 'WTO plus' obligations) into leadership for non-discriminatory reforms of the WTO legal system could also strengthen China's domestic rule of law reforms; 'cosmopolitan rule of law' could benefit traders, producers, investors and consumers in all WTO member countries, revive China's 'cosmopolitan traditions' (e.g. at the times of Marco Polo), and strengthen the democratic legitimacy and effectiveness of WTO law and governance vis-à-vis citizens and other non-governmental economic actors. By empowering citizens and holding multilevel governance institutions more legally and judicially accountable for compliance with international trade rules approved by national parliaments for the benefit of citizens, decentralized enforcement of WTO rules could set incentives for 'republican virtues' of citizens, governments and courts of justice and strengthen 'republican constitutionalism'
protecting the global PG of a mutually beneficial world trading system owned by citizens, peoples and their national republics.
Constitutional democracies committed to protection of human rights emerged in Europe and in the Americas much later than 'republican constitutionalism'. As human rights also protect individual and democratic diversity, there exists a legitimate multitude of diverse national and regional forms of constitutional, representative, participatory and deliberative 'democratic self-governance' of citizens and peoples. Due to its only recent commitment to 'republican constitutionalism' since 1911, China's rulers will need more time to decide on how to reconcile their self-imposed human rights commitments with 'Chinese ways' of democratic self-governance that are likely to remain different from European and American constitutional traditions. The potential welfare gains from opening-up China's political system to competition and 'republican constitutionalism' are likely to be even more important than China's economic gains from joining the WTO trading system. By linking its economic, legal and political 'opening-up policies', China could exercise leadership for WTO reforms similar to the leadership of the EU in opening-up the GATT/WTO legal system to customs unions and international organizations. Exploring such 'leadership strategies' requires cultivating legal philosophy and legal methodology questions (e.g. regarding 'law and economics' and 'republican constitutionalism') that have been unduly neglected inside China due to its lack of rule of law traditions. As international trade and investment law have to be construed 'in conformity with the principles of justice and international law', including also 'human rights and fundamental freedoms for all' (Preamble VCLT), there is no need for explicitly incorporating human rights into worldwide IEL governing countries with very diverse human rights conceptions (e.g. under national, regional and UN HRL). Just as GATT and WTO dispute settlement jurisprudence has avoided violations of human rights in the hundreds of GATT/WTO dispute settlement reports since 1950, the diversity of human rights obligations of WTO members argues for leaving it pragmatically to future WTO jurisprudence, national parliaments, civil society and domestic courts of justice to ensure that HRL and IEL are interpreted, applied and developed in mutually consistent ways for the benefit of citizens, with due respect for their diverse democratic preferences and constitutional traditions.
